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Abstract—Cloud computing is one of the fastest growing segments of IT industry since the users’ commitments for investment
and operations are minimized, and costs are in direct relation to usage and demand. In general, cloud services are required to
authenticate the user and most of the practical cloud services do not provide anonymity of the users. Namely, cloud provider
can track the users easily, so privacy and authenticity are two critical aspects of security. Anonymous authentication is a technique
enabling users to prove that they have privilege without disclosing real identities. This type of authentication can be useful especially
in scenarios where it is sufficient to ensure the server that the claiming parties are indeed registered. Some motivating applications
in the cloud for an anonymous authentication protocol are E-commerce, E-voting, E-library, E-cash and mobile agent applications.
Many existing anonymous authentication protocols assume absolute trust to the cloud provider in which all private keys are stored.
This trust may result in serious security and privacy issues in case of private key leakage from the cloud provider. In this paper, we
propose forward secure anonymous and mutual authentication protocols using RFID technology for cloud services. These protocols
avoid the trustworthiness to the cloud provider. Meaning that, even if the private keys are obtained from the corrupted tags or from
the server owners of these tags cannot be traced from the past authentication actions. In fact, anonymity of the users will still be
ensured even the private keys of tags are compromised.
Keywords—Anonymity, Authentication, Cloud services, RFID, Threshold cryptosystem
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiqui-
tous, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
adjustable computing resources such as networks,
servers, storage, applications and services. These
resource can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of
5th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
(ISCTurkey 2012).
interaction [1], [2]. Information is basically con-
trolled by external parties (i.e., cloud provider).
End users access cloud based applications through
a web browser, a light weight desktop or mobile
applications while the business software and data
are stored on the servers at a remote location.
The main problem of cloud computing is to un-
derstanding and managing the public concern such
as the confidentiality and privacy issues [3]. Con-
sidering cloud as a storage service, as a user stores
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privacy sensitive information in a cloud, the confi-
dentiality of these information is of concern to the
user. To have confidence in storing personal data in a
cloud, the data should be protected against any ma-
licious attacker. Besides the confidentiality of these
sensitive data, the users identity privacy, a primal
right to privacy, is also expected in cloud service. If
the access to a cloud discloses a users real identity,
the user could still be unwilling to accept this issue.
Thus, the user authentication without identifying the
real identity, also called anonymous authentication
[4] is required. In order to preserve user privacy
and allow anonymous authentication/access in a
cloud, users can anonymously authenticate them-
selves as part of authorized users/groups to the cloud
provider. Users can anonymously access and modify
resources. The encrypted data stored by a user can
be decrypted by other members of the same group.
Anonymous authentication can also be used in other
scenarios like such as E-commerce, E-voting, E-
library, E-cash as well as some medical applications,
and mobile agent applications. The end users do not
want to be classified in any manner. In these exam-
ples, people may prefer to register only once (e.g.,
after some payment or being a member) and would
like to keep their anonymity and privacy when they
use these applications. Nonetheless, most of existing
approaches consider a back-end server as trusted
entity and assumed to be physically secure and not
under any attack. However, the security of server-
side cannot be guaranteed for some real-life appli-
cations.For technology simplicity, the authentication
between the user and the service can be achieved
via Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which
is a means for identifying objects via a radio signal,
and enables automated data gathering in a variety of
applications. A typical RFID system is setup by a
set of readers, a number of RFID tags and a back-
end server. In general sense, an RFID tag is known
as a small integrated circuit with a unique identifier
which transmits data over the air in response to
interrogation by an RFID reader [5]. A smart tag,
on the other hand, has on-board processors that are
typically capable of performing cryptographic oper-
ations. These smart RFID cards are being deployed
in a range of applications, including electronic tick-
ets, access control, public transportation payment
cards, and novel forms of credit cards, and they
are likely to be carried by most of the people as
a means of identification, e.g. as a national ID card
or electronic passport. Some recent works show that
public-key cryptosystems can be deployed in RFID
systems [6]–[8]. Our interest here is in smart RFID
tags with public-key cryptosystem, and in particular
we focus on the means of authentication used to
access tag-specific information stored in a back-
end server. Considering anonymity and security,
a variety of security and privacy threats to RFID
authentication protocols have been widely studied,
including, cloning tag, eavesdropping, replay at-
tacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, tracking, and
traceability. Also, it is usually assumed that back-
end server maintains all private information about
tags, assigned keys, etc. In addition to these security
and privacy threats, an adversary that has compro-
mised a server could impersonate a valid tag using
knowledge of the tags internal state. In this paper,
we introduce this practical threat, namely Untrusted
Server Side Attack (Big brother attack). In fact, a
person, who is responsible for operating the server,
may be interested in detailed user profiles (e.g.,
for later misuse). Hence, this malicious officer can
link the users with their authentication information
like authentication time, location. Therefore, if the
contents of a server are revealed or controlled by
an attacker, then such an attack could be used to
cause cloning the tag, impersonating or tracing the
users which is the case for most of the conventional
RFID protocols.
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Motivated by this need, we consider anonymous
RFID based authentication protocol. In these proto-
cols, even if an adversary corrupts the reader as well
as the back-end server, she is not be able to trace
any tags in the system but can authenticate them.
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose an
anonymous RFID authentication protocol for cloud
services without using a trusted third party. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
addresses and tries to provide a solution to the
problem of server side corruption. We show the
security of our protocol against what we called ’Big-
brother attack’ in which the server-side is corrupted
or controlled by a malicious administrator. In this
way, no malicious party from the server side has
sufficient information for computing the private con-
tent of the tags and tracing them. We prevent those
attacks by using threshold cryptosystems between
the server and the tags. Our protocol also achieves
forward and backward secrecy’s. Namely, although
the private keys of tags are obtained this will give
no advantage to trace neither in the past nor in the
future.
Organization of the paper. The rest of this work is
as follows. In Section 2 we briefly address some of
the previous works related to anonymous authen-
tication for both cloud services and RFID. After
that we give a preliminary information about thresh-
old homomorphic cryptosystems and present our
first unilateral anonymous authentication scheme for
RFID in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose our
mutual anonymous authentication scheme. We prove
its security in Section 4.1 and finally conclude our
paper in Section 5.
2. Related Work
There exists many RFID authentication protocols
in the literature, however, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first scheme that utilizes RFID
systems for cloud services. For further information
about existing RFID authentication protocols, we
refer interested readers to the excellent resource
maintained by Avoine [9] and survey papers [10],
[11]. Instead, in what follows we only focus on
anonymous RFID authentication protocols and we
give some of the related authentication schemes for
cloud services.
In 2009, [12] presents a scheme based on the
identity-based hierarchical model for cloud comput-
ing systems. The authors also state that their proto-
col provides corresponding encryption and signature
schemes, an identity-based authentication for cloud
computing. However, this protocol does not consider
the anonymity of the users.
The authors in [13] propose an authentication
scheme for mobile users of cloud services that is
based on a behavioral authentication approach. The
behavioral data is like a call history, SMS activity,
Internet access, location etc. Their scheme balances
the usability and trust through flexible policies and
dynamic tuning. The foremost issue with these cen-
tralized approach is that the cloud provider must be
entrusted with all aspects of this system, including
aggregated data on user contexts and activities, thus
relaxing the trust model to a great extent [14].
In [15], the authors focus on anonymous creden-
tial systems where they propose a generic anony-
mous payment system including anonymous authen-
tication for RFID-powered public transport tickets.
An alternative approach to anonymous RFID-based
payment has been proposed in [16]. In [17], the
authors present an implementation of an anonymous
credential system on Java Cards.
In [18], the authors propose three anonymous
RFID authentication protocols (a 2-pass authenti-
cation protocol and two 1-pass authentication pro-
tocols). The authors claim that the last protocol is
”optimistic” the cost is minimal when the adversary
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is passive.
In [11], the authors present an authentication pro-
tocol and a search protocol for RFID tags. Their au-
thentication protocol provides security and privacy
requirements without the need of a persistent central
database. they also address the disadvantages having
a secure central database and suggested solutions
for overcoming them. Finally, they introduce a new
problem of performing secure search for RFID tags.
In [19], the authors extend the universally com-
posable (UC) framework for RFID authentication
protocols. Informally speaking, the security of UC
protocols is maintained under general composition
with arbitrary other protocols running concurrently,
and therefore such protocols are easily plugged into
more complex protocols in a modular fashion with-
out requiring a new security analysis. In addition
to the availability, anonymity, and authenticity, in
this paper, the authors address the forward-security
issues for this UC framework in the presence of key
compromise. They propose new protocols which
satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and
availability requirements in the UC model. The arti-
cle [20] recently proposed a universally composable
security framework especially for RFID applica-
tions. They adopt RFID setup, communication, and
concurrency assumptions in a model that guarantees
strong security, privacy, and availability properties.
Unlike [19], they do not consider security issues in
the presence of key-compromise and tag corruption.
[21] proposes mutual authentication protocols for
RFID systems. Some significant characteristics of
the protocols are forward security, tag anonymity,
location privacy, low complexity on the back-end
server, and scalability. The authors claim that their
protocols offer the most enhanced security features
in RFID mutual authentication protocols with re-
spect to user privacy. They also show that forward
security and tag anonymity are guaranteed.
The authors in [22] proposed an anonymous RFID
authentication protocol that preserves the security
and privacy properties, and achieves better scalabil-
ity compared with other contemporary approaches.
However, [23] shows that this protocol some of the
claimed security properties (especial untraceability)
are not fulfilled. In this attack, an adversary can
manipulate the messages between a tag and a reader
during the protocol runs and can successfully trace
the tag. The authors in [23] also improves the
flawed protocol to satisfy all the claimed security
and efficiency properties.
In [24], the authors propose an anonymous
authentication scheme that allows RFID tags to
authenticate to readers without disclosing any other
information that allows tags to be traced. Their pro-
tocol provides anonymity and untraceability of tags
against readers, tag authentication and availability.
We note that none of the above work considers
the case of a malicious back-end server.
3. Warm up: Our First Protocol for
Anonymous and Unilateral Authentica-
tion
3.1. Threshold cryptosystems
Our protocols for RFID authentication are based
on threshold cryptosystems [25]. For the complete-
ness of the paper, we give a brief description of
threshold cryptsystems below.
We denote E(m, r) the encryption of message
m using randomness r with a semantically secure
public key encryption scheme. In a (t, n)-threshold
cryptosystem there are n parties, each of them holds
a share of the overall secret key. In the set up phase
a public key is generated which is available for all
n parties to encrypt messages. If at least t parties
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cooperate, any encryption can be successfully de-
crypted, whereas any collusion of less than t parties
cannot get any information about the plaintext.
The most widely used threshold cryptosystems are
(based on) ElGamal or Paillier [26], [27]. Threshold
ElGamal has the drawback of only allowing de-
cryption of values belonging to a relatively small
set, for which it is feasible to compute discrete
logs. On the other hand, Paillier does not have this
problem and allows decryption of encrypted values
in an arbitrarily large set (e.g., 1024-bit integers).
However, the distributed key generation protocol for
threshold Paillier is very expensive compared to that
for threshold ElGamal. Our both protocols are ap-
plicable to any threshold cryptosystem. Without loss
of generality, in our protocols, we use the popular
threshold ElGamal homomorphic encryption as an
instance.
Denote xPi for a value x which belongs to a party
P with an index i. Let q be a prime number of
binary size of n where n is a security parameter.
Gq forms a group of order q generated by g ∈ Gq.
Let f(x) = at−1xt−1 + . . .+ a0 be a polynomial of
degree t where the coefficients are ai ∈ Gq. The
value a0 = f(0) is the overall secret key which is
computed during the setup phase and unknown to
everybody. We denote (xP , yP ) as public and secret
key pair of the party P respectively where yP is
computed as yP = f(xP ).
3.1..0.1 Threshold Decryption.
Given a ciphertext in the (t, n)-threshold cryp-
tosystem and t decryption shares of t parties based
on their respective shares of the secret key every-
one can simply recover the plaintext by using a
reconstruction algorithm. More formally, on cipher-
text c, at least t parties broadcast ci = Dski(c),
where ski denotes the secret key share for the i-
th party at this stage. Later, everyone can perform
m = R(c1, . . . , ct) where c = E(m), where R
denotes the public reconstruction algorithm. Let us
illustrate for the decryption and reconstruction algo-
rithm using (2, n)-threshold ElGamal as an instance.
The domain parameter of the threshold scheme is
(Gq, g). There are two parties in our protocol, the
server S and the i-th tag Ti. Each party has a unique
secret key shares (x, y) which is computed from a
secret curve y = f(x) = a1x + a0 where a0 is
the private key and h = ga0 is the corresponding
public key. Given a message m, the encrypted
message pair is computed as (C = (gr, hrm)) where
r ∈R {0, 1}`. The server computes its decryption
share as σS = g
ryi x
T
xT−xS and the tag computes its
decryption share as σT = g
ryT x
S
xS−xT . Finally, the
original message could be recovered by computing
m′ = h
rm
σSσT
.
3.2. Our protocol
We are now going to present our first protocol
which satisfies anonymous and mutual authentica-
tion. This protocol is interesting since the over-
head for the server can be significantly decreased.
Namely, the server can pre-compute a large set of
encryptions before running the protocol, in this way
the protocol can be more efficient.
Note that the system uses (2, n)-threshold cryp-
tosystems therefore two parties the server and a
tag can decrypt the cipher in order to pass the
authentication. Before going into details, let’s dis-
cuss the reasons behind threshold cryptosystem in
our proposal. First of all, if symmetric encryp-
tion mechanism was used then in order to provide
anonymity the server should encrypt a challenge
using symmetric keys of all tags and send them to
the tag. The tag then chooses its encryption and
decrypts it, and finally sends the challenge back to
the server. A similar observation can also be done
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Server Tagi
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
q, g ∈ Zq
KEY SET-UP
a0, a1 ∈ Zq, h = ga0
f(x) := a1x+ a0
(xS, yS = f(xS)) (xi, yi = f(xi)), xS
PROTOCOL
rS ∈R {0, 1}` r
i←−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri ∈R {0, 1}`
m = rS||ri
r ∈R Zq
C = (hrm, gr)
σ = gry
S
σ,C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
σs = σ
xi
xi−xS
σi = g
ryi x
S
xS−xi
r˜S||r˜i = hrm
σSσi
If ri == r˜i
r̂ := r˜S
else
r̂ ∈R {0, 1}`
return r̂
Check if rS == r̂ r̂←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1. Our anonymous mutual authentication protocol based on (2,n) threshold cryptosystem.
using a public key mechanism. Namely, the server
should encrypt a challenge using public keys of all
the tags and sends them to the tag. Tag similarly
decrypts its encryption and sends the challenge back
to the server. However, these two mechanisms incur
a severe communication and computation overhead,
meaning that a lot of all computation must hold
on the server side and a lot of data must be sent
to the tag. Therefore, we propose to use threshold
encryption which would only require one encryption
and one decryption.
The protocol involves the following entities.
37
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SECURITY SCIENCE
Muhammed Ali Bingo¨l et al., Vol.1, No.2
3.3. Entities
The protocol can be implemented using any
threshold cryptosystem. For ease understanding, we
are going to illustrate our protocol with threshold
ElGamal encryption. In this system, each party
stores only one unique decryption shares (x, y =
f(x)), which is computed and distributed by an
issuer.
1 Server S: The server stores its own key share
(xS, yS).
2 Tag i: Each tag is attached to a single object.
A tag i has enough volatile for computation
and non-volatile memory for storing its own
share (xi, yi) and public share of server (xS).
Tags can compute modular exponentiation and
inversion and can generate random nonces.
3 Issuer I: Issuer generates a prime number q of
binary size of n (n is a security parameter and
should be large enough) that uniquely specifies
a group Gq of order q. It also generates a
generator g which is element of Gq. Moreover,
I sets up a secret polynomial degree of 1
(f(x) := a1x + a0) where the coefficients are
elements of Gq and a0 = f(0) is the actual
secret key. Lastly, I generates unique secret
shares and sets up each entity with unique
share in a secret channel.
The protocol steps are described as follows. The
protocol is also sketched in Figure 1.
Step 1.The i-th tag picks a random value ri ∈R
{0, 1}` and sends it to the server where `
is a security parameter.
Step 2.The server also picks a random value rS ∈R
{0, 1}` and computes an ElGamal encryp-
tion of m = rS||ri. Note that because
of using semantically secure randomized
encryption scheme any two ciphertexts of
a message m are completely different. To
encrypt the message m, she first picks a
random nonce r ∈ Zq. Then the encryption
pair is computed (C = (hrm, gr)). She also
computes the decryption share σ = gryS .
The server sends C and σ to the i-th tag.
Step 3.Upon receiving the message σ,C, the tag
first completes the decryption share of the
server as σs = σ
xi
xi−xS . Then, it computes
its decryption share as σi = g
ryi x
S
xS−xi .
Finally, it recovers the original message as
r˜S||r′i = hrm
σSσi
. If the r˜i is equal to the origi-
nal random value ri, it sends r˜S . Otherwise,
it sends a random value r̂ ∈R {0, 1}`.
Step 4.The server verifies whether the received
value r̂ is equal to the value rS she gener-
ated at Step 1.
In the next section, we will slightly adapt this
protocol to be able to satisfy anonymous and se-
cure mutual authentication. This protocol will be
interesting since the overhead for the server can be
significantly decreased. Namely, the server can pre-
compute a large set of encryptions before running
the protocol, in this way the protocol can be more
efficient.
3.4. Adding/Removing a Tag
Whenever I wants to add a newly generated tag
i to the system, he first picks a random xi and
computes yi value from the curve y = a1x + a0.
Then, (xi, yi) and public key share of the server
xS are attached to tag Ti. In order to revoke a tag
from the system, the issuer simply generates another
secret curve and re-compute the share of the each
tag and the reader.
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Server Tagi
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
q, g ∈ Zq
KEY SET-UP
at, . . . , a0 ∈ Zq, h = ga0
f(x) := at−1xt−1 + . . .+ a1x+ a0
(xS1 , y
S
1 ), . . . , (x
S
t−1, y
S
t−1) (x
i, yi = f(xi))
PROTOCOL
rS ∈R {0, 1}` r
i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri ∈R {0, 1}`
m = rS||ri
r ∈R Zq
C = (hrm, gr)
∀j σj = g
rySj
∏t−1
i=1(i6=j)
xSi
xS
i
−xS
j
(σ1,xS1 ),...,(σt−1,x
S
t−1),C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
σS =
∏t−1
j=1 σ
xi
xi−xS
j
j
σi = g
ryi
∏t−1
j=1
xSj
xS
j
−xi
r˜S||r˜i = hrm
σSσi
If ri == r˜i
r̂ := r˜S
else
r̂ ∈R {0, 1}`
return r̂
Check if rS == r̂ r̂←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2. Our anonymous mutual authentication protocol based on (t,n) threshold cryptosystem.
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4. Our Second Protocol for Anonymous
and Mutual Authentication
We are now ready to present our second anony-
mous protocol in which the server can revoke at
most t− 1 tags. In this system, the server has t− 1
different secret shares ((xS1 , y
S
1 ), . . . , (x
S
t−1, y
S
t−1))
whereas each tag i has only one unique secret share
(xi, yi). This protocol is based on (t, n) threshold
cryptosystem. The protocol steps, which are also
sketched in Figure 2, are described as follows.
Step 1.The i-th tag picks a random value ri ∈
R{0, 1}` and sends it to the server.
Step 2.The server also picks a random nonce
rS ∈R {0, 1}` and computes an ElGamal
encryption of m = rS||ri. To encrypt
the message m, she first picks a random
nonce r ∈ Zq. Then the pair of encryp-
tions are computed (C = (hrm, gr)). She
also computes its decryption shares σi =
gry
S
i ∀i = 1, . . . , t − 1. The server sends
C and the decryption shares along with its
public shares ((σ1, xS1 ), . . . , (σt−1, x
S
t−1)) to
the tag i.
Step 3.Upon receiving the message
((σ1, xS1 ), . . . , (σt−1, x
S
t−1), C), the tag
first completes the decryption shares
of the server as σS =
∏t−1
j=0 σ
xi
xi−xS
j
j .
Then, it computes its decryption share as
σi = g
ryi
∏t−1
j=1
xSj
xS
j
−xi . Finally, it recovers the
original message as r˜S||r˜i = hrm
σSσi
. If the r˜i
is equal to the original random value ri,
it sends r˜S . Otherwise, it sends a random
value r̂ ∈R {0, 1}`.
Step 4.The server verifies whether the received
value r˜S is equal to the value rS she
generated at Step 1.
4.1. Security & Complexity Analysis
For the security analysis, we are going to show
that this protocol fulfills the privacy and security
requirements for RFID authentication.
Theorem 4.1. Our first protocol depicted in Fig-
ure 1 achieves anonymous authentication even the
server is fully corrupted.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that an adversary com-
promises the server and has access to all the private
information. The adversary has two choices for an
attack.
(i) In the first case, she behaves like a semi-
honest party, i.e., follows the protocol properly but
try to identify the tag. In that case, at Step 1
of the protocol, the adversary cannot obtain any
information about the tag since ri is completely
random. At Step 2, the adversary computes the
decryption shares properly and sends them to the
tag. At Step 3, the adversary receives only r̂ which
gives only the information that the tag is one of the
member in the database.
(ii) Now, the adversary does not behaves like a
malicious party. Assume that she access to all the
private values of the tags from the server. Similar
to the previous attacks, the adversary cannot obtain
any information about the tag since ri is completely
random. However, at Step 2, the adversary computes
the decryption shares with one of the secret shares
of the tags in the system and sends them to the
tag. At Step 3, the adversary receives only r̂ which
is random because the tag could not extract his ri,
and hence the tag sends random bits. The adversary
still could not distinguish this tag from others and
therefore cannot identify it.
Corollary 4.2. Our protocol depicted in Figure 1
achieves both forward and backward secrecies with-
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out any assumption.
Proof: (Sketch) Since the protocol achieves
secure and anonymous authentication against even
Big Brother attack (Theorem 4.1), the adversary is
not able to distinguish a tag from others at any time
line. Therefore, our protocol achieves both forward
and backward secrecies.
Unlinkability of tags. The term ‘unlinkability’
means that an attacker cannot distinguish tags based
on their communications. In other words, the proto-
col messages generated by the tags should not leak
any information to an adversary for identification or
traceability. Since only the random numbers (which
is independent of the secret keys) are sent at the first
and the third steps of our protocol, no information
about the tag identity is revealed. At the second
step, the encryptions C, (σi, xSi ) for i = 1, . . . , t− 1
are sent by the server which is common for all the
tags. Therefore, no attacker can be able to link this
message to a tag.
Complexity analysis. Unlike previous protocols,
although our protocols use public key operations
it is completely secure against server side attacks
described above. Still, in total there are only three
exponentiations, three inversion and only one mul-
tiplication for a tag. At the tag side, two inversions
( x
i
xi−xS ,
xS
xS−xi ) can be done off-line and can be
stored on its memory beforehand. At he server side,
only three exponentiations and one multiplication
are performed. We highlight that all the encryptions
and partial decryption done by the server can be pre-
computed off-line. Note that adding a new tag does
not change the complexity of the overall system.
Namely, a new user will only get a new share of
the secret key, and will do the same computations
as other tags. This does not incur any additional
complexity to the server.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed and proposed
a new anonymous and mutual RFID authentication
protocol for cloud services. Our protocol enables
RFID tags to authenticate to readers without disclos-
ing any information that allows the identification
or tracking of tags even to malicious readers. First,
we introduced our first anonymous RFID protocol
to give a warm-up which is based (2, n)-threshold
homomorphic encryption. This protocol does not
provide tag revocation. We then proposed our sec-
ond protocol based on (t, n)-threshold homomor-
phic encryption which allows tag revocations up
to t tags. We highlight that the protocol is still
secure even if the server side is corrupted. However,
our current solution does not capture removing an
tag which is an interesting open problem for future
research. Finally, we show that our protocol satisfies
the security requirements like anonymity, privacy,
authentication and unlinkability.
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